from Congress and is likely to get $2 billion to $2.1 billion. This is three times the annual average military appropriation for Israel (notwithstanding the extraordinary $2.2 billion appropriation to rearm Israel after the October war), and most of it is in the form of outright grants rather than loans as in the past. That request will probably include $350 million a year to compensate for the oil produced by Abu Rudeis, an additional $300 million in economic aid and nearly $1.9 billion in military aid.

Washington's diplomatic and military pledges are no less generous. The U.S. will send Israel its very latest military weapons, such as F-15 Eagle fighter planes and Lance surface-to-surface missiles (range 70 miles), which it has hitherto held back to pressure Jerusalem to compromise on the Sinai. The long lead time needed for procurement and delivery of these weapons means that the U.S. is committed to high levels of military aid for years to come. In addition, it will resupply weapons and

ture
ner-
The
the
ion as long as it refuses to recognize the existence of Israel, not to initiate any new Middle East peace plan without consulting Israel, and to consult immediately if the Soviet Union intervenes militarily in the area. To guarantee Israel's oil supply, the U.S. has agreed by implication to supply Jerusalem with oil from American stocks if such normal suppliers as Iran should renege. The U.S. has also promised to finance a huge oil storage complex for Israel.

This backdoor security treaty calls for so extensive an American involvement that Congress will undoubtedly look at it very closely. The Administration feels the commitments will eventually be accepted. But Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Senator Henry Jackson, for example, have already voiced strong reservations about sending American technicians to the Sinai, as has William Fulbright, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "If we go in there," asks Fulbright, "what answer do we have when the other superpower wants to do the same thing?" Mansfield adds: "One Viet Nam is one Viet Nam too many."

Chopping Block. Some experts discount the Viet Nam analogy. "The situations are wholly different," says Richard Ullman, director of studies for the Council on Foreign Relations and a Princeton professor. "The U.S. 'forces,' so called, are not going as advisers with military capabilities, but as intermediaries with only a monitoring capacity. We are not choosing a side and backing it." Malcolm Kerr, head of U.C.L.A.'s Near East Institute, also discounts the Viet Nam specter. But he argues nonetheless against so great an American involvement: "The U.S. has put its head on the chopping block in behalf of a very limited agreement. We may find ourselves responsible for everybody's good behavior in the region. We are in for risk for some time to come."

The risk obviously exists. The agreement increases the likelihood that the U.S. would become immediately involved in a new war, but it reduces the likelihood that a war will break out. Without an agreement, a new conflict would be more probable—as early as 1976—and it would involve extremely dangerous weapons and a renewed Arab oil boycott. It is an unhappy choice for the U.S. in either case, but the agreement at least changes—in possibly fundamental ways—the relationship between Egypt and Israel. It is not the final, definitive Middle East peace. Israel still holds sizable chunks of Egypt's land, and the P.L.O. last week said it would try to sabotage the agreement, which it called an American plot. But it is a piece of that peace.

The View from the Balcony

When he was diverted from a fashion assignment and ordered to cover the European Security Conference in Helsinki for an Italian weekly last July, Freelance Photographer Franco Rossi, 35, was impressed by the elaborate security arrangements—at first. From his balcony perch in Finlandia House he watched no fewer than seven U.S. Secret Service men checking the area where Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger were to sit. "I saw them even taste the water in Ford and Kissinger's carafes," says Rossi. The photographer had been standing at his tripod for three tedious hours when finally, he recalls, "I saw that Ford was passing a note to Kissinger. So I took a few frames." To his astonishment, Rossi realized that Ford's note—advising Kissinger that the speech they were preparing was too long-winded and gloomy—was perfectly legible through his 600-mm. telephoto lens. "Do we need to place East and West in [adjective indecipherable] confrontation? Why not amplify HOPE, which all want?" Ford urged in his handwritten note.

After 20 minutes of cutting and brightening the speech, Kissinger opened his briefcase and took out three folders. When Kissinger came to a document marked TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY CONTAINS CODEWORD, Rossi clicked away at 1/30 sec., f/5.6 with Tri-X rated 1200 ASA in his 35-mm. Canon equipped with 600-mm. lens. What the camera recorded was a report on diplomatic relations between Paris and Hanoi based on information from "an established CIA source with excellent access" in the French Foreign Ministry. According to the CIA source, the French felt "deceived by Hanoi's assurances that [North Viet Nam] would not invade the South." Piqued, "Paris now refuses to grant Hanoi new credits until the situation in the South clarifies and until Hanoi or Saigon makes a preliminary acknowledgement of debts contracted by the Thieu government."

Says Rossi: "It seemed incredible that they could have overlooked such a basic point—that photographers use telephoto lenses. It seemed like a huge joke." Italy's *Domenica del Corriere* and The Netherlands' *Nieuwe Revue* last week gave their readers Rossi's photos. *Paris-Match* also purchased the pictures but claimed that it did not have the space to run them. Some cynics suggested, however, that *Match's* restraint might have something to do with the French Foreign Ministry.

HENRY KISSINGER READING "TOP SECRET" MEMO DURING HELSINKI SUMMIT